A new technical analysis has exposed six proximity-transfer flaws across Apple AirDrop, Samsung Quick Share on Android, and Google Quick Share for Windows, showing that device-sharing stacks still contain fragile pre-authentication attack surfaces that can be abused from wireless range.
The findings include three AirDrop access crashes, two Quick Share protocol bypasses, and one Windows use-after-free that can potentially escalate beyond denial of service.
The research is notable because the AirDrop issues are reachable before normal trust decisions complete.
In one case, an unauthenticated attacker can send an unexpected HTTP path over the AirDrop listener and trigger a fatal crash in the sharing daemon; in another, a deeply nested XML property list can exhaust stack space in Foundation’s parser; and a malformed HTTP framing sequence can force a NULL-pointer dereference in Network.framework.
Together, these bugs show that a single nearby attacker can repeatedly knock out AirDrop and adjacent continuity services such as AirPlay, Handoff, Universal Clipboard, and Continuity Camera.
On the Quick Share side, the report highlights a different class of design weakness: protocol logic is being enforced too late.
The Samsung Android implementation was found to process some application frames before the UKEY2 authentication handshake finishes, which means an attacker can provoke handler activity without first establishing trust.
The same study also found that, after authentication, some frame types could still bypass the expected encrypted envelope, allowing raw protobuf messages to be accepted in places where encrypted traffic should have been mandatory.
AirDrop and Quick Share Vulnerabilities
According to Arxiv, the most serious Windows issue is a race condition in Google Quick Share’s endpoint management. When two sessions collide with matching identifiers, a freed endpoint object can still be dereferenced by an in-flight callback, creating a classic use-after-free primitive.
AirDrop’s seven-layer state machine and DVZip adaptive compression from binary analysis, build AIRFUZZ,
a protocol-aware fuzzer that mutates pre-compression representations, and complement it with targeted hand-written
analyses of Samsung’s Quick Share service.

The authors note that this was enough to demonstrate a reliable crash, and that the bug class is potentially exploitable depending on heap layout and mitigation state.
These bugs matter because they sit in software that is always listening, always nearby, and often assumed to be low-risk convenience plumbing.
The attack radius is limited to wireless proximity, but that is still enough for airports, offices, campuses, and transit hubs where many devices may be within range at once.
The research also underlines a broader lesson: if authentication, encryption, and input validation are not enforced at the dispatcher level, individual handlers can become attack surface.
The paper says the issues were responsibly disclosed to Apple, Samsung, and Google, with acknowledgments already received for some findings and remediation underway for others.
It also releases protocol research and fuzzing artifacts, which should help defenders and reverse engineers study similar proximity-sharing stacks more systematically.
This work builds on earlier research into AirDrop’s AWDL transport and proximity security, while extending the analysis into the application layer where HTTP routing, plist parsing, and archive handling create additional failure points.
For Quick Share, it complements prior reports on Nearby Connections and Google Windows implementation, but adds Samsung-specific weaknesses that show how OEM customizations can widen the attack surface.
The practical takeaway is straightforward: proximity-sharing features need the same hardening discipline as internet-facing services, especially around parser depth, state-machine transitions, and crash-safe error handling.
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