Threat actors hijacked HBO Max’s verified Reddit account, u/hbomax, and used its trusted advertising identity to distribute 108 malicious ClickFix advertisements in a coordinated 48-hour malvertising campaign.
The operation, tracked as PasteSwitch, delivered platform-specific malware to macOS and Windows users, including information stealers, in-memory loaders, cryptocurrency clippers, and fake wallet applications.
The campaign came to public attention after Reddit user Alex Cutts reported a suspicious promoted post in r/cybersecurity.
The ad appeared to originate from HBO Max’s official verified account and promoted a native macOS HBO Max application.
That application does not exist, but the branding, advertising placement, and verified identity gave the lure an unusual degree of legitimacy.
Victims who clicked the ad were redirected to counterfeit HBO Max-themed landing pages, including hbomaxx[.]us.
Rather than serving a conventional installer, the site displayed a ClickFix-style overlay that instructed users to copy and paste a command into Terminal.
The technique shifts execution from the browser to a trusted local utility controlled by the victim, helping attackers evade browser download warnings and many reputation-based protections.
Research by Hudson Rock and ADAMnetworks linked the incident to a broader cross-platform delivery framework named PasteSwitch.
The name reflects the campaign’s core mechanic: users paste an attacker-supplied command, while backend infrastructure determines which lure, payload, operating-system branch, and monetization method to serve.
HudsonRock Researchers said that, the compromised HBO Max account was used aggressively before the operation rotated away from exposed domains.
The 108 ads did not exclusively impersonate HBO Max. The actors used several lure categories, including 40 advertisements pointing to hbomaxx[.]app, 36 tied to the developer-oriented codex-craft[.]com, 15 promoting a fake macOS disk-cleaning service, 11 using the code-desktop[.]com theme, and six directing users to hbomax-macos[.]com.
The mix shows that the operators were targeting both entertainment users and technically inclined victims searching for AI, coding, and system-utility software.
On macOS, PasteSwitch used curl | zsh execution chains to deploy malware associated with the MacSync and Atomic macOS Stealer, or AMOS, ecosystems.
The MacSync branch reportedly collected browser credentials, Gecko profiles, Telegram data, Apple Notes, and macOS passwords before packaging stolen data into /tmp/osalogging.zip for exfiltration.
Other observed flows used native helper binaries and persistence paths resembling .com.apple.accountsd, while separate fake Ledger, Trezor, and Exodus applications sought victims’ 12- or 24-word BIP39 recovery phrases.
Windows visitors were routed to an InstallFix chain based on mshta and PowerShell. The delivery process used an MP3/HTA polyglot, established scheduled-task persistence, attempted to disable AMSI, and loaded the Amatera Stealer directly into memory.
Researchers also documented a deceptive command-and-control technique in which Amatera communicated with 77.91.65.13:443 while presenting facebook.com in TLS SNI and HTTP authority fields.
This can mislead basic network monitoring that relies too heavily on SNI metadata.
PasteSwitch also supported cryptocurrency theft. Its AnimateClipper and ZigClipper components replaced copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses and used Binance Smart Chain smart contracts as mutable command-and-control dead drops.
According to the research, the operators changed mainnet data repeatedly between March and July 2026, enabling rapid infrastructure rotation even when conventional domains were detected or blocked.
Reddit administrators paused the malicious advertising activity and began an internal security investigation.
The initial access path into the HBO Max advertising account has not been publicly disclosed, and neither Reddit nor Warner Bros. Discovery has released victim-impact figures.
The incident demonstrates why verified accounts cannot be treated as proof that an advertisement or download is safe.
Users should never paste commands from an ad, CAPTCHA, “repair” prompt, or download page into Terminal, PowerShell, Command Prompt, or the Windows Run dialog.
Organizations should additionally monitor for unexpected mshta, PowerShell, curl | zsh, scheduled-task creation, and direct-to-IP TLS connections masquerading as trusted domains.
| Address | Branch | Role | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
45.94.47.204:80 | AMOS helper | Enrollment, task polling, and acknowledgement | April PCAP and helper analysis |
77.91.65.13:443 | Amatera | Direct-to-IP TLS C2 using facebook.com SNI | Exact PE execution |
165.22.199.85 | September macOS | Telemetry and /contact exfiltration | September macOS execution |
164.90.161.147:80 | September macOS | Post-execution HTTP contact | September macOS execution |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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