A highly targeted Lampion malware campaign abusing localized phishing lures to compromise users in Portugal.
The activity reflects a continued evolution of the Brazilian-origin banking trojan, first documented in 2019, which has consistently focused on Portuguese-speaking victims rather than domestic Brazilian targets.
In the latest campaign, attackers leverage convincing financial-themed phishing emails masquerading as routine business communications, including payment receipts and administrative notices.
The emails are crafted in Portuguese and include realistic business signatures, confidentiality disclaimers, and branding elements to increase credibility.
The infection begins with a ZIP archive attachment containing an inflated HTML file of approximately 1.3MB. The file is deliberately padded with junk markup and randomized strings to evade static detection mechanisms.
When opened, the HTML renders a spoofed SAPO file transfer interface abusing the branding of Portugal’s widely used online service portal to trick victims into interacting with the content.
Behind the interface, embedded JavaScript initiates the next stage by retrieving a remote payload from attacker-controlled infrastructure.
One observed URL, resolved from an obfuscated string, points to hxxps://fat-contabislitaca[.]com/js/1898.php. The script dynamically injects the downloaded code into the browser session, enabling execution without writing immediately suspicious files to disk.
The second stage introduces heavily obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) payloads, often exceeding 7MB in size while containing only minimal functional code.
These scripts maintain naming conventions aligned with the phishing lure, such as “Comprovativo_Junho,” reinforcing the illusion of legitimacy.
Once executed, the VBS establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks and generating additional downloader scripts within the system’s temporary directory.
The final stage of the infection chain is significantly more complex, comprising roughly 1,000 lines of deobfuscated logic. It enforces single-instance execution via WMI, removes competing scripts, and generates a unique victim identifier derived from system attributes such as BIOS, GPU, and hostname.
Acronis Threat Research Unit (TRU) said in a report shared with GBhackers, identified an active Lampion, derived from the ChePro malware lineage, is known for its modular, multi-stage infection architecture and heavy reliance on obfuscation to evade analysis.
The malware communicates with its command-and-control (C2) server using this fingerprint, transmitting encoded telemetry including antivirus presence and system metadata.
A key characteristic of this stage is its chunked payload delivery mechanism. The malware downloads its final payload a DLL-based remote access trojan in 10MB segments using HTTP range requests.
These fragments are reassembled locally using ADODB.Stream before execution via rundll32, invoking the exported function “jangadeiro,” a reference consistent with the malware’s Brazilian origins.
Notably, the final payload reaches an unusually large size of approximately 750MB. Analysis suggests this is primarily due to excessive junk padding rather than functional complexity, a tactic designed to hinder sandboxing and automated analysis systems.
Security teams should monitor for suspicious ZIP-delivered HTML attachments, anomalous VBS execution chains, and large outbound HTTP range-based downloads.
Similar oversized loaders have been observed in prior Lampion campaigns, indicating a consistent anti-analysis strategy.
Telemetry data shows that 94.6% of detections are concentrated in Portugal, with minor spillover observed in Spain and the United Kingdom.
This geographic skew reinforces the assessment that the campaign is highly targeted, leveraging localized language and trusted brand impersonation to maximize infection success.
The Lampion campaign underscores a broader trend in financially motivated malware operations: combining social engineering precision with layered technical obfuscation.
By fragmenting execution across multiple stages and inflating payload sizes, attackers significantly reduce visibility for defenders relying on traditional detection methods.
The continued abuse of trusted regional brands such as SAPO highlights the importance of user awareness alongside technical controls.
| Category | SHA-256 Hash |
|---|---|
| Phishing Email | 87efeada5fe39a94cefc6151fd84af223d0e0e2b070daec606274481ed87b87b |
| Phishing Email | ab46f7c4d3f717bb1e61d2f236917976d2a85be6958ae099fee79ea6e9031e37 |
| ZIP Attachment | b1c101bd1ba134ffbea61f9fac2b7c8fbd13ca113a37944abdc131ef86da92ac |
| ZIP Attachment | c6618bb692fb3f5d7959f8db1fedaaac5e8a36fb901397a008aa2b88874448fd |
| HTML File | 036c8f32012abdcb9a389ae9c284da89505e830bca74eb1aa9ea3794b067aab6 |
| HTML File | d25d32478ae67403484a309591b6409224d26ca3d094c5ccd8428ebef7efcfd1 |
| HTML File | 643c0093baec45952a46b0210f7a6f8fb26883b396b66f1cb609c5b55e6dae1e |
| HTML File | 050e84d134a32ed7c4885a9d57ce37f8ae5f910960b67e2156941961bd5781ba |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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