Cyber Security News

Trojanized Exodus Wallet Installer Deploys RAT to Steal Browser Credentials and Cookies

A sophisticated malware campaign has abused a trojanized installer for the legitimate Exodus cryptocurrency wallet to deploy a modular remote access trojan (RAT) capable of stealing browser credentials, session cookies, and extension data.

The campaign prioritizes long-term interactive access over direct cryptocurrency theft, combining hidden VNC, SOCKS proxying, file management and browser-data theft in an unusually stealthy package.

Between late July and mid-August 2026, Huntress identified compromises at four unrelated protected organizations. Three victims were affected within 85 minutes on August 18, using an installer created only a day earlier.

The speed of delivery and rapid payload rebuilds indicate an active operation rather than opportunistic reuse of an older malware kit.

The intrusion begins with a JavaScript lure disguised as either a PDF document or a software update contained in a ZIP archive.

In one route, victims download files with a .pdf.js double extension, which can appear as harmless PDFs when Windows hides known file extensions.

Opening the file launches Windows Script Host, displays a legitimate decoy document hosted on trusted infrastructure, and silently installs an MSI package through msiexec.

A second observed route used a ZIP file containing a JavaScript “update.” Victims opened the script directly from Explorer’s compressed-folder view, leaving a temporary path containing the distinctive .zip.116\ fragment.

The script then launched a real legal-document decoy while quietly installing the malicious MSI in the background.

The MSI masquerades as a product named “Background Service” from “Apple Inc.” and installs a real copy of Exodus Wallet version 24.33.4 under %APPDATA%\ExdBackupTool\. At the time of Huntress’ analysis, the roughly 201 MB package had no detections on VirusTotal.

How an unopenable crypto wallet ends up installing a modular RAT to steal browser credentials (Source : Huntress).

Its apparent legitimacy is central to the evasion strategy: the bundled wallet communicates with genuine Exodus services and retains almost all of the original application files.

Huntress Researchers said that, discovered infrastructure capable of redirecting victims through the search-ms: protocol into a WebDAV-hosted Explorer view, although no confirmed victims used that route.

Trojanized Exodus Wallet Installer

Only three files in the wallet’s 1,973-file application bundle were modified. One patch prevents Electron windows from appearing by replacing the show(), focus() and center() methods, leaving the wallet running invisibly without a taskbar entry or user interface.

The “Open Windows Explorer?” browser prompt served by us05[.]org (Source : Huntress).

A second altered source file loads a 50 MB JavaScript component that acts as a manual PE loader, decrypting and memory-mapping a 10 MB Windows payload without writing it to disk.

The decrypted RAT contains six modules for remote command execution, file operations, script execution, SOCKS proxying, hidden VNC access, and browser theft.

The browser component targets Chrome, Edge and Firefox, collecting saved passwords, cookies, autofill information and extension data.

It also includes a cookie-wiping capability designed to force victims to reauthenticate, potentially giving operators another opportunity to capture valid sessions or credentials.

Instead of relying solely on attacker-controlled infrastructure, the malware uses Azure Table Storage as a command-and-control dead drop.

The RAT creates and polls table entries for tasking and results, blending malicious traffic into a legitimate Microsoft cloud service. This complicates network blocking and can delay disruption while defenders submit abuse reports.

Persistence is established through a scheduled task named ExdBackupTool, which relaunches the invisible Exodus.exe every hour.

Researchers also observed a related task, INetHealth, that repeatedly clears Windows proxy settings.

That behavior appears designed to bypass enterprise proxy inspection because the RAT retrieves the current user’s Internet Explorer proxy configuration before initiating communications.

Organizations should treat a detection as a full interactive compromise, not simply an infostealer incident.

Hidden VNC and SOCKS functionality may allow operators to access affected systems directly, move through internal networks and use compromised endpoints as relays.

Defenders should investigate for ExdBackupTool, ExodusHelper, an invisible Electron wallet process under %APPDATA%, scheduled task launches from svchost.exe, and suspicious JavaScript execution originating from browsers, download folders or ZIP staging paths.

Security teams should also inspect %TEMP% for MSI artifacts, as a coding error in the JavaScript dropper can prevent cleanup after installation.

Credential response must extend beyond password resets. Stolen session cookies may remain valid after a password change, so affected organizations should revoke active web sessions, rotate credentials, invalidate browser sessions and review identity-provider logs for token reuse.

Enabling Windows file-extension visibility, restricting Windows Script Host execution from user-writable paths, and turning off the WebClient service where WebDAV is unnecessary can reduce exposure to the campaign’s delivery mechanisms.

IOCs

ItemDescription
jn0101.msi SHA256: c513a7346484ee69a2931c4a89956ee50aa63e4366ef989315e669d8f10d7485Fake “Exodus Backup Tool” installer, 210,767,872 bytes, unsigned, 0/76 on VirusTotal
SHA256: 8c3b41ea5a85778145a6e5772bfee2eb0f8b027d0af199fb71a76dfb8bb29e5aDecrypted modular RAT payload, memory-resident only, not present on VirusTotal, nor uploadable.
%APPDATA%\ExdBackupTool\Install directory. Genuine Exodus installs to %LOCALAPPDATA%\exodus
app.asar Trojanized Exodus 24.33.4 bundle, 281,876,194 bytes, 3 of 1,973 files modified
debug.log Attacker build artifact shipped by mistake, 1,830 bytes, references C:\123\exodusUpdater:
%TEMP%\<guid>.tmp.node koffi FFI module extracted from the asar at runtime, 2,340,864 bytes

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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Mayura Kathir

Mayura Kathir is a cybersecurity reporter at GBHackers News, covering daily incidents including data breaches, malware attacks, cybercrime, vulnerabilities, zero-day exploits, and more.

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