Fake Certificate Issued for Alibaba Cloud After SSL.com Validation Trick

A critical vulnerability in SSL.com’s domain validation process allowed unauthorized parties to fraudulently obtain TLS certificates for high-profile domains, including Alibaba Cloud’s aliyun.com, researchers revealed this week.

The certificate authority (CA) has since revoked 11 improperly issued certificates, raising concerns about trust in automated validation systems.

How Domain Validation Was Exploited

According to Mozilla report, SSL.com’s Domain Control Validation (DCV) system, designed to verify ownership of a domain before issuing certificates, contained a loophole in its “Email to DNS TXT Contact” method (BR 3.2.2.4.14). Attackers could trick the system by:

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1. Creating a DNS TXT record for a subdomain (e.g., _validation-contactemail.[random].test.dcv-inspector.com) with an email address from a target domain (e.g., user@aliyun.com).
2. Requesting a certificate for the subdomain, triggering a validation email to the provided address.
3. Completing validation, which erroneously marked aliyun.com (the email’s domain) as verified.

This allowed attackers to request certificates for the target domain itself, bypassing proper authorization.

SSL.com revoked certificates for multiple domains, including:

• aliyun.com (Alibaba Cloud’s webmail and cloud service)
• *.medinet.ca (Canadian healthcare software provider)
• help.gurusoft.com.sg (Singaporean supply-chain tech support)
• banners.betvictor.com (BetVictor gambling ads)

These certificates could have enabled phishing sites, HTTPS traffic interception, or impersonation of legitimate services.

While no malicious use has been confirmed, the potential for abuse was significant.

In a preliminary report, SSL.com’s Rebecca Kelley acknowledged the flaw, attributing it to an “incorrect implementation” of validation logic.

The compromised DCV method has been temporarily disabled, and affected certificates were revoked within 24 hours of discovery.

Key actions:

• Revoked certificates: 11 total, issued between June 2024 and March 2025.
• Disclosure: Full incident report expected by May 2, 2025.
• Mitigation: Enhanced validation checks and manual audits.

Critics argue the incident underscores systemic risks in automated CA processes. “A single validation bug can compromise trust across the web,” said cybersecurity analyst Mika Chen.

1. Third-party email providers: CAs must avoid conflating email domain ownership with target domain control.
2. Transparency: SSL.com has not disclosed whether attackers exploited the flaw beyond the researcher’s demo.
3. Vigilance: Organizations should monitor Certificate Transparency logs for unauthorized issuances.

SSL.com’s swift revocation limits immediate harm, but the incident highlights the fragile balance between automation and security in certificate issuance. 

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