A new APT group, dubbed Actor240524, launched a spear-phishing campaign targeting Azerbaijani and Israeli diplomats on July 1, 2024, where the attackers employed a malicious Word document containing Azerbaijani-language content disguised as official documentation to lure victims.
The attack indicates a potential focus on disrupting the Azerbaijan-Israel relationship, as the group leverages new Trojan programs, ABCloader and ABCsync, to steal sensitive data and remains undetected through various countermeasures.
An attack commences with a phishing document that, upon user interaction, executes embedded VBA code to decrypt and store a malicious payload as a seemingly benign .log file.
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It acts as a loader, performs environment checks, evades analysis, and decrypts additional payloads, including a DLL. Subsequently, it loads the DLL, establishing a connection to a C2 server for remote command execution and control.
The ABCloader and ABCsync Trojans employ robust anti-analysis measures. Critical components, including strings and API calls, are encrypted to hinder static and sandbox analysis.
Additionally, the Trojans actively check the process environment for debugging indicators, such as the BeingDebugged flag and NtGlobalFlag, as well as leveraging NtQueryInformationProcess to identify debugging states, thus thwarting dynamic analysis attempts.
The techniques aim to identify debugging environments by analyzing system characteristics and process attributes.
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Hardware breakpoint detection, screen resolution analysis, process count enumeration, and permission verification collectively assess the execution context for anomalies indicative of virtualized or sandboxed environments.
The attack payloads “ABCloader” and “ABCsync” employ anti-debugging measures, encrypted communication, and registry manipulation to establish persistence and remote control, suggesting an advanced, under-development threat actor.
While the Trojan, ABCsync, uses UDP for encrypted communication with a C2 server, employing AES-256 CBC for data protection.
It executes remote shells, manipulates files, and exfiltrates data through pipe communication, receiving command-based instructions from the C2, which exhibits characteristics of a work-in-progress with detailed, sequential commands suggesting a complex control end.
According to NSFOCUS Security Labs, by leveraging system information, it establishes pipes for shell execution, reads and writes files, and includes error handling and system version detection mechanisms.
A malicious actor employs a multi-stage attack. synchronize.exe, a loader similar to ABCloader, removes its own encryption for persistence. vcruntime190.dll and vcruntime220.dll hijack legitimate system components, LanguageComponentsInstaller.dll and Windows.UI.FileExplorer.dll, respectively, to execute synchronize.exe, ensuring its continued presence.
The decoy document, iden.doc, with hash 1ee73b17111ab0ffb2f62690310f4ada, likely serves as an initial infection vector, while the C2 server, 185.23.253.143:36731, is the command-and-control endpoint for further malicious operations.
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