BlackByte, a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group that surfaced about mid-2021 appears to have traces of Conti’s evolution.
It uses productive sophistication such as bypassing security measures through the use of kernel-level exploited drivers, inducing self-replicating ransomware with worm features, and leveraging living-off-the-lead binaries.
This shows its advances shifting from one programming language or code over to the other Go, .NET, and C++.
Cyber security analysts at Cisco Talos discovered that BlackByte hackers have been exploiting VMware ESXi Auth bypass vulnerability.
Technical Analysis
More recent attacks employ VPN credentials for initial access through brute forcing and gain elevated privileges through CVE-2024-37085 in VMWare ESXI.
BlackByte exploits NTLM for internal movement in the network using pass-the-hash methods, hides ransomware (ExByte) as harmless files like “atieclxx.exe”, and launches a ransomware attack (“host.exe”) by passing some command line switches (-s [8-digit string] svc).
The ransomware is deployed as a service and, in this case, spreads via SMB, many of its actions are executed from C:\SystemData, and new files such as ‘MsExchangeLog1.log’ log execution progress.
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BlackByte is also reported to manage Active Directory, add administrative groups called ‘ESX Admins,’ and modify security applications using registry keys.
The group’s data exfiltration methods might exploit their customized tool ExByte, however, these details remain classified due to their off-network staging as well as the collateral damages caused by encryption.
Taking into account only those victims that are publicly available, there is no reason for concern about this group as it seems to have limited activity.
However, recently Cisco Talos’ telemetry which is collected globally has shown some BlackByte activity is not as limited as it appears.
The BlackByte ransomware has upgraded its extension to .blackbytent_h and utilizes the technique of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) on the following four vulnerable drivers:-
- RtCore64.sys
- DBUtil_2_3.sys
- zamguard64.sys
- gdrv.sys
Current scenario shows that the ransomware self-encrypts and sends a self-destruction command(/c ping 1.1.1[.]1 -n 10 > Nul & fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=503808 c:\windows\host.exe & Del c:\windows\host.exe /F /Q), exploits compromise of the network using dumped credentials and the NetShareEnumAll function with ‘SRVSVC’ named pipe, bypassed Windows Defender scanning by altering registry settings (HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS DEFENDER).
The malware deletes system binaries (taskmgr.exe, perfmon.exe, shutdown.exe, resmon.exe), and communicates with msdl.microsoft[.]com (204.79.197[.]219) for debugging symbols, and targets various industries, with manufacturing most affected (32% of victims).
The transition of BlackByte from C# to Go and now C/C++ is a major step forward in order to utilize anti-analysis methods.
The ransomware’s self-propagating nature, BYOVD usage, and custom per-victim compilation pose significant challenges which lead to the introduction of more advanced methods of defense and in some cases even enterprise-wide password changes for the whole organization if better control is required.
Recommendations
Here below we have mentioned all the recommendations:-
- Implement MFA for remote and cloud access.
- Audit VPN configurations.
- Set alerts for privileged group changes.
- Limit or disable NTLM.
- Disable SMBv1 and enforce SMB signing.
- Deploy EDR across all systems.
- Disable vendor accounts and remote access.
- Detect unauthorized configuration changes.
- Document enterprise password reset procedures.
- Harden and patch ESX hosts.
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