Nowadays spammer takes place to initiate an Advanced technique to create a spam and phishing emails to target a large number of community in worldwide and possibly leads to biggest attacks.

As a matter of first importance, it is normal for spammers to target Google Analytics with messages that induce the site proprietor to take after the connection.

This particular spammer has been dynamic with this battle for a while now. Google Analytics spam can be very irritating since it twists the reporting. There are many review accessible online you can use to decrease the bot activity to your destinations and the spam that appears in your reports.

The most concerning issue here is that this shrewd individual (in Russia) has effectively enlisted the area “ɢ for his own utilization.


You may think, “How could they get Google’s space?” Take a more critical take a gander at it, see anything odd in contrast with the genuine “” area? That is not a real capital G in the spam message, it is Unicode character 0x0262 which is the Latin Letter Small Capital G.

This is what is called an International Domain Name (IDN) Homograph Attack, a progressed phishing strategy used to betray clients into speaking with a site or area by misusing the way that diverse characters resemble the other alike.

The person behind the “ɢ” area could acquire it by enrolling the Punycode space name xn– –” Since IDNs utilize Punycode translation to change over Unicode to ASCII characters, the area name winds up being put away in DNS as “ɢ” So clueless clients suspecting that they are tapping on a connection for will really be interfacing with “xn- –”

Google Analytics report for tested website was showing that 18% of his visitors had the below message showing up under the language field. Typically, this field shows language abbreviations depicting the native language of the visitor to the site such as: “en”, “es”, “fr”.

“Secret.ɢ You are invited! Enter only with this ticket URL. Copy it. Vote for Trump!”

Most clients are acclimated to checking space names in connections before they tap on them, yet depending on that as a countermeasure is not satisfactory when these progressed phishing techniques are utilized.

An assailant could undoubtedly setup a fake site and catch client certifications as they attempt to login while making the web address and website content both give off an impression of being genuine.

There are some IDN homographs that are impossible to distinguish between the original when relying on human interpretation.

As an example, looking at “wikipediа.org” you won’t notice any difference from the real Wikipedia domain, however, the last “a” is Cyrillic Small Letter A and the underlying domain is actually “” You can validate this yourself by using a web-based tool called Punycode Converter.

BALAJI is a Former Security Researcher (Threat Research Labs) at Comodo Cybersecurity. Editor-in-Chief & Co-Founder - Cyber Security News & GBHackers On Security.


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